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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to introduce communication in a collective choice envi-
ronment with information acquisition. We concentrate on decision panels that are
comprised of agents sharing a common goal and having a joint task. Members of the
panel decide whether to acquire costly information or not, preceding the communica-
tion stage. We take a mechanism design approach and consider a designer who can
choose the size of the decision panel, the procedure by which it selects the collective
choice, and the communication protocol by which its members abide prior to casting
their individual action choices. We characterize the solution of this extended design
problem. We find that the optimal communication protocol in such an environment
balances a tradeoff between inducing players to acquire information and extracting
the maximal amount of information from them. In particular, the optimal device
may lead to suboptimal aggregation of information from a statistical point of view.
Furthermore, groups producing the optimal collective decisions are bounded in size.
Comparative statics results shed light on the regularities the design solution exhibits.
For example, the expected utility of all agents decreases with the cost of private infor-
mation and increases with its accuracy, but the optimal panel size is not monotonic
in the signals’ accuracy.
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I delight in talking politics. I talk them all day long. But I can’t bear
listening to them.
- Oscar Wilde, An Ideal Husband.
1 Introduction
Many real world group decisions incorporate a communication phase as part of the decision
making procedure. For example, trial jurors are made to deliberate before casting their
votes, hiring committees meet before making their final hiring recommendations, and top
management teams convene before determining their firm’s investment strategies.
The focus of this paper is the introduction of communication into a mechanism design
problem of collective choice with information acquisition.
We analyze a mechanism design problem involving the choice of one out of two al-
ternatives. We consider a group of homogeneous agents who are capable of investing in
information acquisition. The designer chooses the size, communication system, and voting
rule in order to maximize the (common) expected utility of the collective decision. Our
goal is to characterize the solution of this mechanism design problem.
The characterization of the optimal mechanism yields a few interesting insights: 1. In
order to provide strong incentives for information acquisition, the optimal device does not
necessarily utilize all the information that is reported; 2. The optimal size of the decision
panel is bounded and does not necessarily coincide with the maximal number of agents who
can be induced to purchase information in equilibrium; and 3. The comparative statics of
the optimal mechanism exhibit some regularities and irregularities, e.g., the expected social
value is monotonic in the cost of information and accuracy of private information, but the
optimal panel size is not monotonic in the signals’ accuracy.
Formally, we consider the standard voting setup (see Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1998]
or Persico [2002]). There are two possible states of the world and two alternatives that
need to be matched to the states. All agents have the same utility function and a common
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prior on the state of the world. At the outset of the game, each agent in the chosen panel
can pay a positive cost and receive, in return, a signal of fixed accuracy. Players can
then communicate with one another after which they cast their simultaneous votes. The
model can serve as a parable to the decision making process of a jury (each juror decides
whether to attend the testimonies or not, the jurors then meet to discuss the case, after
which they simultaneously cast their votes), an advisory committee (each member invests
in information and gives advice following conversation with the other committee members),
etc.
We consider a designer with identical preferences to those of the agents in the popu-
lation. The designer chooses the size of the decision panel, the voting rule by which the
collective choice is made, and the protocol according to which panel members communicate.
For any fixed size n of the decision panel, there are many voting rules available for
the designer to choose from. For example, one class of well-known procedures is that
of threshold voting rules, parametrized by r = 1, . . . , n. Under voting rule r, the first
alternative is chosen if and only if at least r agents vote in favor of it. The results in
Gerardi and Yariv [2003] simplify the designer’s problem tremendously by illustrating that
communication renders a large class of voting rules equivalent with respect to the sequential
equilibrium outcomes they yield (see Section 3 for a complete description of the results). For
example, the intermediate threshold voting rules 2, ..., n− 1 are non-dictatorial and hence
yield the same set of sequential equilibrium outcomes. Furthermore, the set of sequential
equilibrium outcomes corresponding to any other voting rule (such as the threshold voting
rules r = 1 and r = n) is included in this set. In our current framework, Gerardi and
Yariv [2003] implies that the designer’s choice of voting rule does not affect the collective
outcomes and that she can concentrate on communication devices that give only unanimous
recommendations.
For any fixed number of agents, the optimal scenario, which we term the first best,
entails all agents purchasing information and reporting truthfully. This information is then
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utilized in a statistically efficient way. That is, for every profile of signals, the optimal
device calculates, using Bayes’ rule, the probability that each state of the world has been
realized and chooses the optimal alternative.
Unfortunately, for large numbers of agents, the marginal contribution of each signal
becomes quite low and, since the cost of information is positive, a free rider problem
disables the first best scenario from constituting an equilibrium.
The benevolent designer faces two options. The mechanism can simply induce a small
number of agents to purchase information and make the best statistical use of it. Alterna-
tively, the designer can alleviate the free rider problem by using an aggregation rule which
is not statistically efficient, thus increasing the incentives to acquire information. This ap-
proach involves a compromise between achieving more information in the population, but
creating intentional distortions in the interpretation of the collective signals.
Our theoretical results indicate that the optimal design employs both approaches. One
can achieve the optimal expected social value by using distortionary mechanisms. These
are devices that induce more players to acquire information than would be possible if the
mechanismwere using statistically efficient rules in creating recommendations. Nonetheless,
the optimal mechanism does not always exhaust the number of agents that can be induced
to purchase information. That is, the optimal size of a panel of decision makers may be
smaller than the maximal number of players who can be made to invest in information in
equilibrium.
The mechanism design problem described so far depends on essentially three parameters:
a preference parameter indicating the relative preference of matching each alternative to
each state (in the terminology of the jury literature, this is the weight each juror puts
on convicting the innocent relative to acquitting the guilty), the accuracy of the private
information, and the cost of private information.
There are a few interesting insights regarding the comparative statics of the mechanism
design problem. As was already mentioned, the expected (common) utility of the optimal
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mechanism is decreasing in the cost of information and increasing in the accuracy of avail-
able signals. It also appears that as the cost of information increases, the optimal decision
panel decreases in size. Finally, the optimal committee size is not monotonic in the signals’
accuracy.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 overviews some of the related literature.
Section 3 presents the design problem analyzed in the paper. Section 4 illustrates the
important features of the optimal mechanism, regarding the size of the committee, and
the way the information agents report is aggregated. Section 5 provides some comparative
statics pertaining to the optimal design solution. Section 6 concludes. Most technical
proofs are relegated to the Appendix. Throughout the paper we label the group of decision
makers a decision panel or committee interchangeably.
2 Related Literature
The current paper is linked to a few strands of literature. First, the paper contributes
to the literature on mechanism design with endogenous information. While most of this
literature deals with auction and public good models (see, e.g., Auriol and Gary-Bobo
[1999], Bergemann and Välimäki [2002], and references therein), there are a few exceptions
focusing on collective decision-making.
Persico [2002] is possibly the closest paper to ours. He considers jury decisions and
allows the jurors to acquire information before voting. In contrast to our model, the jurors
are not allowed to communicate. Persico [2002] analyzes the problem of the designer who
can choose the size of the jury and the voting rule. While the tension between giving
incentives to acquire information and aggregating information efficiently comes through
in his framework, the optimal mechanism is very different from ours. In particular, the
distinction between different voting rules plays a crucial role in Persico [2002] but becomes
irrelevant in our context once we allow for communication.
Li [2001] considers a committee of a fixed size and allows each player to invest in the
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precision of her private signal. Information is a public good and, thus, there is an insufficient
effort to gather information. To alleviate this problem, it is optimal to introduce statistical
distortions to the decision rule. In Li [2001] investments as well as signals are publicly
observed and thereby verifiable. As we show below, in our setup verifiability assures that a
non-distortionary rule is optimal when the committee is large enough. It is in environments
in which investment and acquired signals are not transparent (such as in the case of jury
decisions, hiring committee decisions, etc.) that distortionary devices end up being optimal.
Mukhopadhaya [1998] restricts attention to majority rule elections and compares com-
mittees of different sizes. Players decide whether to acquire information or not before
voting (and communication is prohibited). Mukhopadhaya [1998] shows that the quality
of the decision may worsen when the size of the committee increases. Cai [2003] looks
at a continuous framework in which the policy preferences and information structures are
captured by normal random variables. Members exert non-verifiable efforts in gathering
information, report these preferences to the principal, who then uses the mean decision
rule to determine the collective policy. Cai characterizes the optimal committee size in this
setting and shows that it is finite. Furthermore, Cai illustrates that the optimal size is
non-monotonic in the variation of preferences of the committee members.
Our paper is also connected with a few recent attempts to model strategic voting with
communication. Coughlan [2000] adds a straw poll preceding the voting stage. He shows
that voters reveal their information truthfully if and only if their preferences are sufficiently
close. Doraszelski, Gerardi and Squintani [2002] study a two-player model with commu-
nication and voting. Preferences are heterogenous (not necessarily aligned) and private
information. They show that some, but not all, information is transmitted in equilibrium,
and that communication is beneficial. Austen-Smith and Feddersen [2002] analyze a model
in which a deliberative committee of three agents needs to choose one of two alternatives.
Each player has private information on two dimensions: perfect information concerning
her preferences and noisy information concerning the state of the world. Austen-Smith
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and Feddersen model deliberations as a one-round process in which all players simultane-
ously send public messages. They show that when such deliberations precede the voting
stage, majority rule induces more information sharing and fewer decision-making errors
than unanimity.
As mentioned, Gerardi and Yariv [2003] show that communication renders a wide range
of voting rules equivalent with respect to the sequential equilibrium outcomes they produce.
These results are used in our current analysis. They imply that the designer’s choice
of voting rule does not affect the collective outcomes and that she can concentrate on
communication devices that give only unanimous recommendations.
In the political science literature, Habermas [1976] was one of the first to lay foundations
for the deliberative democracy school. He put forward a universal theory of pragmatism and
directed attention to the importance of communication as foundations for social action. His
theory served as a trigger for an entire body of work focusing on the effects of communication
on how institutions function and, consequentially, should be designed (see Elster [1998] for
a good review of the state of the art of the field). The research presented here provides an
initial formal framework to study some of these issues.
3 Mechanism Design with Information Acquisition
In this section we introduce our general setup and some preliminary observations. We con-
centrate on the case replicating the standard committee voting problem (see, e.g., Feddersen
and Pesendorfer [1998] or Persico [2002]). While our setup is germane to many collective
decision environments, the reader may find it useful to trace our modeling choices with a
jury metaphor in mind.
There are two states of the world, I (innocent) and G (guilty), with prior distribution
(P (I) , P (G)) . The alternatives (or decisions) are A (acquittal), and C (conviction). There
is an infinite pool of identical agents. All the agents as well as the mechanism designer
share the same preferences which depend on the state of the world and the final decision.
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Let q be a number in (0, 1) . The common utility is given by:
u (d,ω) =
 −q if d = C and ω = I− (1− q) if d = A and ω = G
0 otherwise.
where d and ω denote the collective decision and the state of the world, respectively.
To intuit this utility specification, consider a jury decision scenario. Jurors prefer to
make the correct decision, i.e., acquitting the innocent and convicting the guilty (in this
case we normalize the utility to zero). The ratio q
1−q can be thought of as the jurors’
perceived cost of convicting the innocent relative to that of acquitting the guilty.
Each agent can purchase a signal of accuracy p > 1
2
. That is, upon paying the cost
c > 0, the agent receives a signal s ∈ {i, g} satisfying Pr (s = i|I) = Pr (s = g|G) = p.
Using the jury metaphor, each juror has to decide whether to pay attention or not to the
testimonies presented during the trial. These testimonies provide a noisy signal concerning
the guilt of the defendant.
If more than one agent purchases information, we assume their signals are conditionally
independent. Moreover, we only attend to the case in which an agent can buy at most one
signal. While these assumptions may not always be completely realistic, they serve as a
first approximation and make our benchmark model tractable.
Committees make joint decisions by voting. A voting rule specifies a set of actions for
each player and an alternative (A or C) for every profile of actions. A well-known class of
voting procedures consists of threshold voting rules. Consider a committee of size n. Under
the threshold voting rule r = 1, . . . , n, each member can vote for either alternative, A or
C, and the final decision is C if and only if r or more members vote in favor of it. Later on
we will be using the notion of non-dictatorial voting rules. A voting rule is non-dictatorial
if for every alternative, A or C, there exists an action profile that yields that alternative,
and is robust to unilateral deviations (i.e., the alternative is chosen even if a single player
changes her action). For example, in a committee of size n, any threshold voting rule
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r = 2, . . . , n− 1 is non-dictatorial, while the voting rules r = 1 and r = n (the unanimity
rule) are dictatorial.
We allow the members of a committee to communicate before casting their votes. We
therefore add a cheap talk phase to the voting game and consider cheap talk extensions.
A cheap talk extension is a game that consists of one or more communication stages and
a voting stage. In every communication stage, the members exchange messages among
themselves (we assume that an impartial mediator is not available). In the last stage (the
voting stage), the players choose their votes simultaneously. Payoffs depend on the players’
signals and votes, but not on their messages (see Myerson [1991] for a general definition of
cheap talk extensions to arbitrary games).
In our environment there are infinitely many ways to make a collective decision. First,
we can have committees of different sizes. Second, for a committee of a given size we can
choose different voting rules. Finally, we can select different protocols according to which
the members of a committee communicate before casting their votes. Of course, these
variables will affect the agents’ decisions (whether they acquire information or not, as well
as how they communicate and vote) and, therefore, the quality of the final decision. We
now analyze the problem of designing the optimal mechanism. To accomplish this, we
study the following game.
Stage 1 The designer chooses an extended mechanism, i.e., the size of the committee n, the
voting rule, and a cheap talk extension (i.e., how the players can exchange messages
before voting).
Stage 2 All agents observe the designer’s mechanism. Each agent j = 1, ..., n decides
whether to purchase a signal. These choices are made simultaneously, and each
member of the committee does not observe whether other members have acquired
information.1
1Our analysis would, in fact, be tremendously simplified if investments were overt (see Footnote 5).
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Stage 3 All the agents in the committee exchange messages (as specified by the cheap talk
extension) and vote.
Note that the chosen extended mechanism is comprised partly of the size of the decision
panel. This is where we use the assumption that there exists an infinite pool of identical
players free to be selected by the designer as participants in the collective decision making
process.
Stages 2 and 3 constitute an extensive-form game played by the agents 1, ..., n. We re-
strict attention to sequential equilibria in which the players use pure (behavioral) strategies
in Stage 2, and are allowed to randomize in Stage 3. A strategy profile of this game deter-
mines an outcome (i.e., the probabilities that the correct decision is made in state I and in
state G) and therefore, the expected common utility of the decision. The designer chooses
the mechanism to maximize her utility (from the decision). In particular, the designer
does not take into account the cost incurred by the informed agents. There are different
situations in which this assumption is appropriate. The designer may be a principal who
delegates the final decision to a committee. Alternatively, the decision may affect the wel-
fare of every individual in a large society and the designer can be a benevolent planner
(Persico [2002]). In this case, any increase in the utility from the decision can compensate
for the information costs paid by the agents.
The assumption that players can invest in information, thereby endogenizing their types,
which does appear in Persico [2002], is a deviation from some of the prevalent models in
the literature (e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks [1996] and Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1996,
1998]). We find this model particularly appealing both on realistic and theoretical grounds.
Indeed, when thinking about real-life decision panels, players need to decide whether (and
sometimes to what extent) to invest in information acquisition: jurors choose whether to
However, in many situations in which agents engage in information acquisition, investment in information
is indeed covert and signals are non-verifiable. For example, jurors would have a hard time proving they
had attended testimonies, committee members do not check whether their colleagues have gone over the
relevant background information before convening, etc.
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attend or not the testimonies presented to them, hiring committee members decide whether
to carefully go over the candidate’s portfolio or not, etc. Theoretically, this framework
allows us to study mechanism design in situations where there are two forces at play. On
the one hand, the mechanism should use the information available as efficiently as possible.
On the other hand, the mechanism needs to provide agents with incentives to invest in
information.
We denote each agent j’s type in Stage 3 by tj ∈ Tj ≡ {φ, i, g}, where φ stands for
an agent who does not purchase information, and i or g stand for an agent who purchases
information and receives i or g as the realized signals, respectively.
The analysis presented in Gerardi and Yariv [2003] simplifies enormously the designer’s
problem. Indeed, once players decide whether to acquire information or not, and the
appropriate signals are realized, we are in the setup of that paper. Suppose the jury has
at least three members. Consider a voting rule and a communication protocol. A strategy
profile of the corresponding cheap talk extension induces a mapping from the set of types’
profiles into [0, 1] , the set of probability distributions over the alternatives A and C. For
any voting rule ψ, Gerardi and Yariv characterize Γψ, the set of mappings induced by
sequential equilibria of arbitrary cheap talk extensions. We remind the reader of the notion
of non-dictatorial voting rules, introduced earlier, which identifies rules such that for every
alternative, A or C, there exists an action profile that yields that alternative, and is robust
to unilateral deviations. Gerardi and Yariv show that all non-dictatorial voting rules are
equivalent, in the sense that they all implement the same set of mappings (Γψ = Γψ0 for
any pair (ψ,ψ0) of non-dictatorial voting rules). Gerardi and Yariv also show that with
a dictatorial voting rule it is possible to implement only a subset of mappings (if ψ is
non-dictatorial and ψ0 is dictatorial, then Γψ0 ⊆ Γψ). Finally, they demonstrate that any
element of Γψ can be implemented with a sequential equilibrium in which there is always
unanimous consensus at the voting stage.
These results imply that when the size of the committee is n > 2, we can ignore the
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choice of the voting rule. Moreover, we only need to consider mappings from types into
final decisions that give all players an incentive to reveal their private information. To state
formally this simplified problem, we need to introduce some notation. A communication
device in a committee of size n is a mapping γ : T1 × ... × Tn → [0, 1] (recall that Tj =
{φ, i, g}). Given a committee with n members and a communication device γ, consider the
following game. All players simultaneously decide whether to purchase a signal. Then each
player j = 1, ..., n reports her type to the device, and γ (t) denotes the probability that the
defendant is convicted when the vector of reports is t.2 We refer to this game as the game
induced by γ. Let σj define player j’s choice at the information acquisition stage, i.e., σj
specifies whether player j acquires information or not (as already mentioned, we do not
allow for mixed strategies in this stage of the game). Given σj, we let (σj, ∗) define the
strategy under which player j chooses σj at the information acquisition stage and reports
truthfully her type to the device.
It follows from Gerardi and Yariv [2003] that when the designer chooses a commit-
tee of size n > 2, we need only to consider pairs of decision profiles (σ1, . . . ,σn) and
communication devices γ such that the strategy profile ((σ1, ∗) , . . . , (σn, ∗)) constitutes
a (sequential) equilibrium of the game induced by γ.3 This means that the acquisition
strategies (σ1, . . . ,σn) and the communication device γ have to satisfy the following two
constraints. First, given (σ1, . . . ,σn) , the device γ is incentive compatible (i.e., each player
has an incentive to reveal her type truthfully). Second, if all players report their true types
2Although we restrict attention to direct communication, the reader may find it useful to interpret the
device as an exogenous mediator who helps the members of the committee communicate (in Gerardi and
Yariv [2003] we show that there is no difference between mediated and unmediated communication). If the
players report vector t to the mediator, then with probability γ (t) she recommends to every player to vote
in favor of conviction (and with probability 1 − γ (t) the mediator invites all player to vote to acquit). If
the voting rule is non-dictatorial, each player has no incentive to disobey the mediator’s recommendation
provided that all her opponents behave likewise.
3In this paper, we do not assume that the designer is able to commit to a function that maps the
players’ information into final decisions (perfect commitment). One would think that perfect commitment
is beneficial for the designer. Our analysis shows that this is not the case. With communication and
non-dictatorial voting rules it is possible to implement the same outcomes that can be implemented with
perfect commitment.
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to the device γ and player j’s opponents use strategies (σ1, . . . ,σj−1,σj+1, . . . ,σn) then σj
is optimal for player j (where j = 1, . . . , n).
Although this problem is much simpler to analyze than the original one, in order to
characterize the optimal mechanism we still have to consider all possible sizes and, for
each size, all pairs ((σ1, . . . ,σn) , γ) that satisfy the requirements described above.We now
present a number of steps that further simplify the designer’s problem.
Given the committee size n, there are many pairs ((σ1, . . . ,σn) , γ) for which the strategy
profile ((σ1, ∗) , . . . , (σn, ∗)) is an equilibrium of the game induced by γ. In particular, there
are profiles (σ1, . . . ,σn) in which all players acquire information, and profiles (σ1, . . . ,σn) in
which one or more players do not pay the cost c to observe a signal. However, without loss
of generality, we can restrict attention to profiles (σ1, . . . ,σn) in which every member of the
committee buys the signal. Consider an outcome implemented by a pair (((σ1, . . . ,σn) , γ))
in which only players 1, ..., n0 acquire the signal, where n0 < n. It is easy to show that the
same outcome can be implemented with a committee of size n0 and a communication device
γ0 that gives incentives to all members to acquire information and report it truthfully. For
every vector of reports t1, ..., tn0 , let γ0 (t1, ..., tn0) = γ (t1, ..., tn0 ,φ, ...,φ) . Under the original
pair (((σ1, . . . ,σn) , γ)), the first n0 players know that players n0+1, ..., n do not purchase the
signal and report message φ to the device γ (remember that γ induces truthful revelation).
If players 1, ..., n0 decide to acquire information and be sincere under γ then they have
an incentive to do the same under γ0. Therefore, in the remainder of the section we focus
on communication devices that induce all players to acquire information and reveal it
sincerely (provided that her opponents behave likewise). We call these devices admissible.
It is important to note that admissible devices are characterized by two classes of incentive
compatibility constraints. The first is the already introduced truthful revelation constraint.
The second guarantees that each player best responds by acquiring information.
The next step of our analysis is to show that we can ignore what a communication device
specifies when one or more players report the message φ. Consider an admissible device
12






denote the expected utility (from the decision) of player
j when her type is tj, she reports message t0j and all her opponents acquire information and
are sincere. Truthful revelation holds if and only if:





¢ ∀j = 1, ..., n, ∀ ¡tj, t0j¢ ∈ {φ, i, g}2 . (1)
The expected utility of player j when she does not acquire information can be expressed
as:
Uj (φ,φ) = Pr (i)Uj (i,φ) + Pr (g)Uj (g,φ) ,
where Pr (s) denotes the probability that agent j will observe signal s = i, g if she acquires
information. It follows that agent j will purchase the signal if and only if the following
information acquisition constraint is satisfied:
Pr (i)Uj (i, i) + Pr (g)Uj (g, g)− c > Pr (i)Uj (i,φ) + Pr (g)Uj (g,φ) . (2)
Constraints (1) and (2) imply that a necessary condition for a communication device
to be admissible is that for every player j = 1, ..., n :
Pr (g) (Uj (g, g)− Uj (g, i)) > c, (3)
Pr (i) (Uj (i, i)− Uj (i, g)) > c. (4)
These inequalities guarantee that agent j prefers to buy the signal and be sincere rather
than not buy the signal and always report one of s = i, g (i in the first inequality, g in the
second one).
We now explain in which sense inequalities (3) and (4) are also a sufficient condition for
a device to be admissible. Consider a device γ : {φ, i, g}n → [0, 1] , and suppose inequalities
(3) and (4) hold. This device may not be incentive compatible. In particular, a player may
have an incentive to lie when her type is φ. Consider, however, the outcome induced by γ
when all players acquire information and are sincere. This outcome can be implemented
with the following admissible device γ0. Given γ, consider player j = 1, ..., n and assume
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that all her opponents acquire information and are sincere. Suppose that player j does not
observe a signal and has to choose between message i and message g. Denote by sj the
message that agent j prefers to send. That is, sj ∈ {i, g} and is such that









where s0j = i, g.
Given the device γ, we construct γ0 as follows:
γ0 (t) =
(
γ (t) if t ∈ {i, g}n
γ (sj, t−j) if t = (φ, t−j) and t−j ∈ {i, g}n−1
,
and we assign an arbitrary value to γ0 (t) when two or more players report message φ.
Intuitively, when each player different from j sends either i or g, the device γ0 interprets
message φ of player j as message sj.
Notice that the expressions in inequalities (3) and (4) do not depend on what the device
specifies when some players report φ.We can, therefore, think of an admissible device as a
mapping γ : {i, g}n → [0, 1] which satisfies conditions (3) and (4).
An admissible device γ is symmetric if for every vector (t1, ..., tn) in {i, g}n and every




. In a symmetric device, the
probability that the defendant is convicted depends only on the number of messages g (or
i) but not on the identity of the players who send g. We now argue that there is no loss of
generality in considering only symmetric devices. In fact, suppose that γ is an admissible
device and consider a permutation ϕ on {1, ..., n} (let Λn denote the set of such permuta-




for every {t1, ..., tn}
in {i, g}n . Since all players are identical and γ is admissible, the device γϕ is also admis-
sible and outcome equivalent to γ. Of course, convex combinations of admissible devices










is admissible and outcome equivalent to the original device γ.
In order to emphasize the points illustrated so far, we recap our discussion as follows:
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Summary Without loss of generality, the designer can restrict attention to mechanisms
in which the following two qualifications pertain:
1. Admissibility - all committee members acquire information and report their signals
truthfully;
2. Symmetry - committee members are anonymous.
A symmetric device can be represented as a mapping γ : {0, 1, ..., n} → [0, 1] , where
γ (k) denotes the probability that the defendant is convicted (alternative C is chosen) when
k players report the guilty signal g (each player can report either i or g). For a symmetric














f (k;n) (γ (k)− γ (k + 1)) > c, (ICg)
where f (·;n) : R→ R is defined by:
f (x;n) = −qP (I) (1− p)x pn−x + (1− q)P (G) px (1− p)n−x .
For each n > 2, we look for the optimal admissible device, i.e., the admissible device
that maximizes the expected utility of the decision. This amounts to solving the following
linear programming problem Pn :
max
γ:{0,...,n}→[0,1]







f (k;n) γ (k)
s.t. (ICi), (ICg).
We denote by γ̄n the solution to problem Pn (if it exists), and by V (n) the expected
utility of the optimal device. If problem Pn does not have any feasible solution, we set
V (n) = −1.
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To complete the description of all mechanisms, we need to consider committees with less
than three players. We let V (0) = max {−qP (I) ,− (1− q)P (G)} denote the expected
utility of the optimal decision when no information is available.
Suppose n = 1, i.e., the designer delegates the final decision to a single agent. Let V̂ (1)
be the expected utility of the optimal decision of the agent when she acquires information.
Formally,
V̂ (1) = max
γ:{0,1}→[0,1]
− (1− q)P (G) +
1X
k=0
f (k; 1) γ (k) .
If the benefit of buying the signal, V̂ (1)−V (0) , is greater than or equal to the cost c, the
agent will acquire information, and we set V (1) = V̂ (1) . Otherwise, we set V (1) = −1.
Finally, suppose that the designer chooses a committee with two agents. We define
problem P2 in the same way as Pn for n > 2.We let V (2) denote the value of the objective
function at the solution (if it exists). Notice, however, that problem P2 does not guarantee
that V (2) can be achieved by the extended mechanism designer. In fact, when n = 2, a
player can be pivotal at the voting stage and we need to take into account her incentives to
follow the mediator’s recommendation (constrains (ICi) and (ICg) do not capture these
incentives). In other words, V (2) represents an upper bound of the expected utility that
can be achieved with two players. If the problem P2 does not admit any feasible solution,
we set V (2) = −1.
The optimal mechanism consists of the optimal size of the committee n∗, and the optimal
admissible device γ̄n∗ . n
∗ is such that V (n∗) > V (n) , for every nonnegative integer n.4 In
what follows, we will demonstrate that the optimal size of the committee is always finite.
Furthermore, when the cost of acquiring information is sufficiently low, the optimal size n∗
is greater than 2 (see below) and, therefore, the expected utility V (n∗) can be achieved.
4Notice that V (0) > −1, and, thus, n > 1 can be the optimal size only if problem Pn admits a feasible
solution. Similarly, n = 1 can be optimal only if the agent who has to make the final decision acquires
information.
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4 Features of The Optimal Extended Mechanism
The extended mechanism the designer chooses is comprised of the size of the decision panel
as well as the incentive scheme it will operate under. In Subsection 4.1 we tackle the
first aspect of this design problem. Namely, we illustrate that the optimal committee is of
bounded size. In Subsection 4.2 we illustrate some traits of the optimal device the designer
would choose. In particular, we show that imperfectly aggregating the available information
may induce more players to acquire information, thereby yielding a higher overall expected
utility level.
4.1 The Scope of The Committee
Our first result, Proposition 1, shows that the solution to our design problem always exists.
In fact, we show that when the size of the committee is very large it is impossible to give the
incentive to all the members to acquire information. That is, committees with too many
members do not have any admissible device. Intuitively, when there are many agents in the
committee, the marginal contribution of an additional signal is relatively small. Therefore,
each agent has an incentive to save the cost c and benefit from the information acquired
by the other participants. In other words, in large committees there is a severe free rider
problem.
Proposition 1 Fix P (I) , q, p and c. There exists n̄ such that for every n > n̄, problem
Pn does not have any feasible solution.
Proof. See Appendix.
Clearly, it follows from Proposition 1 that the optimal size of the committee n∗ is finite
and smaller than n̄. This, in turn, implies that when information is costly, the probability of
making the wrong decision is bounded away from zero. This observation stands in contrast
to the underlying message of the information aggregation literature (see, e.g., Feddersen
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and Pesendorfer [1996, 1997]) in which a large pool of agents yields complete aggregation
of all of the available information.
It is interesting to note that the fact that Pñ does not have any feasible solution does
not imply that Pn does not have any feasible solution for all n > ñ. For example, for
P (I) = P (G) = 1
2
, p = 0.8, q = 0.7, and c = 0.32, P6 and P7 have feasible solutions, while
P5 does not. In the proof of Proposition 1, we provide a formula for an upper bound beyond
which no feasible solution exists. This is potentially useful for computational reasons.
Indeed, in order to find the optimal n∗, one needs to check for the values produced by the
feasible solutions of Pn. As illustrated, calculating consecutively the solutions for P1, P2, P3,
etc. and arriving at an n for which no feasible solution to Pn exists is no indication that
committees bigger than n are not optimal. Thus, an upper bound is necessary for the
designer to limit her search.
4.2 Optimal Distortionary Devices
The next question is how the optimal device uses the information of the agents. To analyze
this problem, let us first consider the case in which the designer makes the final decision
after observing n free signals. This will give us an upper bound on what the designer can
achieve when she chooses a committee of size n and information is costly.
To find the optimal decision rule, we simply need to maximize the objective function of
problem Pn (without the constraints). We let γBn denote the solution to this maximization
problem. γBn , which we call a Bayesian device, is of the form:
γBn (k) =
½
0 if f (k;n) 6 0
1 if f (k;n) > 0
,
(in fact, when f (k;n) = 0, γBn (k) can be any number in the unit interval).
To interpret this result, notice that f (k;n) is positive (negative) if and only if the cost
of convicting the innocent q is smaller (greater) than the probability that the defendant is
guilty given that k of n signals are g.
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Another way to express the Bayesian device γBn is:
γBn (k) =
½
0 if k 6 z (n)
1 if k > z (n)
.
For small values of n, z (n) can be negative or greater than n. In the first case, the
optimal decision is always to convict the defendant. In the latter case, the optimal de-
cision is always to acquit. These cases arise when the designer is very concerned with a
particular mistake (acquitting the guilty or convicting the innocent), and the signal is not
very accurate, i.e., p is close to 1/2. In both cases the n signals are of no value. For large
values of n, however, z (n) is positive and smaller than n (z (n) /n converges to 1/2 as n
goes to infinity), and the defendant will be convicted if and only if the designer observes
sufficiently many guilty signals.
We let V̂ (n) denote the expected utility of the Bayesian device:








The utility V̂ (n) is nondecreasing in the number of signals n.Moreover, V̂ (n) is strictly
greater than V (0) , the expected utility of the optimal uninformed decision, if and only if
z (n) belongs to (0, n) . If z (n) is not in (0, n) , then V (0) = V̂ (1) = ... = V̂ (n) .
When n becomes unboundedly large, the Bayesian device uses an infinitely increasing
number of i.i.d. signals. The law of large numbers ensures that all uncertainty vanishes
asymptotically. In particular, V̂ (n) converges to zero, the no uncertainty value, when n
goes to infinity.5
5Note that if information acquisition is overt and c < 1, then V̂ (n) is implementable (in Nash equilib-
rium) for sufficiently large n. Indeed, consider the following scenario. The designer selects the Bayesian
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We now return to the original design problem. Clearly, the expected utility of the
optimal admissible device V (n) cannot be greater than V̂ (n) , since the Bayesian device
γBn is the solution to the unconstrained problem. On the other hand, when the Bayesian
device γBn is admissible, we have V (n) = V̂ (n) . In this case the designer is able to give
the incentive to the n agents to acquire the signal and, at the same time, to make the best
use of the available information. Proposition 2 shows that this can happen if and only if
the contribution of the last signal to the utility of a single decision maker is greater than
or equal to its cost.
Proposition 2 For every n > 2, V (n) = V̂ (n) if and only if V̂ (n)− V̂ (n− 1) > c.
Proof. See Appendix.
The following example provides an intuition for Proposition 2. The Bayesian device
γB9 of a committee of size 9 selects conviction if at least 5 players report a guilty signal.
Consider the Bayesian device γB8 for the committee of size 8. There are two cases, depending
on p, q and P (I): (a) the device selects conviction when there are at least 4 guilty signals;
(b) it selects conviction when there are at least 5 guilty signals. Consider the committee
with 9 members and suppose that each opponent of player 1 acquires information and is
sincere. Player 1’s expected utility if she also acquires information and is sincere is equal
to V̂ (9) − c. However, if player 1 does not purchase the signal and reports message g in
case (a) and message i in case (b), she gets V̂ (8) . The proof of Proposition 2 formalizes
this argument.
We assume that there exists at least one integer for which the Bayesian device is ad-
missible. Let nB denote the greatest such integer. That is, V̂
¡
nB
¢ − V̂ ¡nB − 1¢ > c,
device γBn as long as everyone purchases information, and a device γ that makes a choice contrary to
the Bayesian prescription if any agent does not purchase information (i.e., for all k, γ(k) = 1 − γBn (k)).
The strategy profile under which all players acquire information and are always sincere constitutes a Nash
equilibrium. Under this profile, the expected utility of the decision approaches 0. If one player deviates
and does not acquire information, she drives the common utility to a level that approaches −1. Finally,
no agent has an incentive to lie upon acquiring information.
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and V̂ (n) − V̂ (n− 1) < c for every n > nB. The existence of nB is guaranteed by the
fact that the sequence
n
V̂ (1) , ..., V̂ (n) , ....
o
converges (to zero). The designer can induce
more than nB players to acquire information only if she selects a device that aggregates the
available information suboptimally. On the other hand, more information will be available
in larger committees. How should the designer solve this trade-off? Is the optimal size of
the committee equal to or larger than nB? Before answering these questions, let us explain
why we believe they are important.
Suppose n is such that the Bayesian device is admissible. We now show that there
is a very simple mechanism that does not require communication and allows the designer
to obtain utility V̂ (n) . Let kn be the smallest integer greater than z (n) . Notice that kn
belongs to {1, ..., n} since V̂ (n) can be greater than V̂ (n− 1) only if z (n) is in (0, n) .
Consider the following game. Each agent decides whether to buy a signal or not. Then
the players vote, and the defendant is convicted if and only if at least kn agents vote to
convict. This game admits an equilibrium in which each player acquires the signal and
votes sincerely (i.e., she votes to convict if and only if she observes signal g). The expected
utility of the decision when the agents play this equilibrium is, of course, V̂ (n) .
Consider our design problem. If the optimal size of the committee is nB, then commu-
nication is unnecessary and the designer simply needs to select the threshold voting rule
knB (this is the optimal mechanism in Persico [2002] where communication is not allowed).
On the other hand, if the optimal size is larger than nB, then communication may play a
very important role in the solution to the designer’s problem.6 Proposition 3 shows that
this is indeed the case (at least when the cost is sufficiently low).
Before formally stating the result, we need to introduce one technical assumption. We
6As noted by Nicola Persico, our results have an alternative interpretation. Namely, the optimal device
γ described in our analysis could be implemented without communication, but with a probabilistic voting
rule (essentially, a voting rule that determines the final choice to be C with probability γ (k) when k players
vote for that alternative). Since such rules do not seem to be very prevalent (consequentially, they have
received little, if no, attention in the literature), we find our interpretation of communication as the channel
by which aggregate choices are randomized to be more natural.
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say the environment is regular if
ln( qP (I)(1−q)P (G))
ln( p1−p)
is not an integer. This implies that for all
n, z(n), the Bayesian threshold value, is not an integer. In a regular environment, if n is
such that V̂ (n) > V (0), then for all n0 > n, V̂ (n0 + 1) > V̂ (n0). Note that assuming the
environment is regular is not restrictive since this is, generically, the case.
Proposition 3 Fix P (I) , q and p and assume the environment is regular. Let n∗ (c)
denote the optimal size of the committee when the cost of acquiring information is c. There
exists c̄ > 0 such that for every c < c̄, V (n∗ (c)) < V̂ (n∗ (c)) .
Proof. See Appendix.
In the proof of Proposition 3, we show that if nB is sufficiently large (or equivalently,
if c is sufficiently low), then there exists a non Bayesian device for a committee of size









Although we do not have a necessary condition for the optimal size to be greater than nB,
notice that the result in Proposition 3 cannot be extended to all values of c. Consider the
environment P (I) = P (G), p = 0.85, q = 0.52, and c = 0.035 (the environment is regular).
In this case the optimal size n∗ and nB coincide and are equal to three.
4.3 Example
In this section, we provide a simple example illustrating the forces that are at play in
constructing the optimal mechanism. We choose one configuration of parameters that
allows us to focus on a small committee (five members) and show how distorting the
Bayesian device can be beneficial.
Specifically, consider the environment characterized by equally likely states, i.e., P (I) =
P (G) = 1
2
, preference parameter of q = 0.72, and signals of accuracy p = 0.65 available for
the cost c = 0.014.
Without communication, we can concentrate on V̂ (n). A simple calculation yields that
V̂ (1) = −0.14, V̂ (2) = −0.12495, V̂ (3) = −0.1169875, and V̂ (n) − V̂ (n − 1) < c for any
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0 if k < 2
1 if k = 2
.
In particular, any one of the two agents is pivotal only when the other receives the g signal,
which occurs with probability 1
2
.




0 if k 6 3
1 if k > 3
(using the above notation z(5) = 3.2628). To illustrate how distorting the Bayesian device
can help satisfy the incentive constraints, we now introduce a device γα of the following
form:
γα(k) =
 0 k < 3α k = 3
1 k > 3
, where α ∈ [0, 1].
Note that γ0 coincides with the Bayesian device γB5 . Given a device γ
α, let us consider
the incentives that a player faces. Without loss of generality, we focus on player 1. Suppose
that players 2, . . . , 5 acquire information and report it truthfully. We let y = 0, . . . , 4 de-
note the number of guilty signals observed by player 1’s opponents. We let Wg (α) denote
the difference between player 1’s expected utility from the decision when she acquires in-
formation and behaves sincerely and her utility when she remains uninformed and reports
message g (Wg (α) does not take into account the cost of information). A necessary condi-
tion for player 1 to acquire information is Wg (α) > c (the other condition is Wi (α) > c,
where Wi (α) is defined in the obvious way with respect to the blind report of i).
In order to compute Wg (α) it will be helpful to consider Table 1. The first column
describes the events in which player 1’s information is relevant, that is, situations in which
she is pivotal. The second column contains the probabilities of these events. In the third
column, we report the change in the probability of conviction between the case in which
player 1 sends message i and the case in which she sends message g (the analysis above
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allows us to ignore the incentives to report φ rather than i or g). Finally, the last column
describes the difference in player 1’s utility between acquittal and conviction.
Relevant events Pr (ω) Pr (y|ω) Pr (i|ω) |γα(y)− γα(y + 1)| Change in utility
ω = I, y = 2, s1 = i
1
2
(0.3105375) (0.65) α 0.72
ω = I, y = 3, s1 = i
1
2
(0.111475) (0.65) 1− α 0.72
ω = G, y = 2, s1 = i
1
2
(0.3105375) (0.35) α −0.28
ω = G, y = 3, s1 = i
1
2
(0.384475) (0.35) 1− α −0.28
Table 1: Expected Benefits of Information Acquisition
Since we are comparing the case in which player 1 invests in information and is sincere
with the case in which she is uninformed and reports message g, it is obvious that player
1’s utility is affected only when she observes an innocent signal. There are four relevant
cases to consider, corresponding to the rows of Table 1:
1. (First Row) Suppose that the state of the world is ω = I, y = 2 and player 1 observes
i. The probability of this event is 1
2
(0.3105375) (0.65) . Since the defendant is innocent,
player 1 will benefit from a decrease in the probability of conviction (the benefit is
equal to q = 0.72). Compare now the case in which player 1 sends message i with
the case in which she sends message g. Since y = 2, the decrease in the probability
of conviction is γα(3)− γα(2) = α.
2. (Second Row) The second row considers the analogous case in which the state is I,
and player 1 and one of her opponents observe an innocent signal. The probability of
this event is 1
2
(0.111475) (0.65) . Again, the state is I and player 1 will benefit from a
decrease in the probability of conviction. By reporting message i instead of message
g, player 1 decreases the probability of conviction by 1−α. Of course, we do not need
24
to consider y = 0, 1, 4 because in these cases the final decision does not depend on
player 1’s message (player 1 is not pivotal).
3. (Third Row) Suppose now that the state is ω = G, y = 2 and player 1 observes i (third
row). The probability of this event is 1
2
(0.3105375) (0.35) . The state of the world is
G and, thus, player 1 will suffer from a decrease in the probability of conviction (the
net benefit is − (1− q) = −0.28). By reporting message i instead of message g the
probability of conviction decreases by α.
4. (Fourth Row) Finally, the last case to consider is ω = G and player 1 and one of
her opponents observe an innocent signal (last row). This happens with probability
1
2
(0.384475) (0.35) . A decrease in the probability of conviction will decrease player
1’s utility (since the defendant is guilty). A change from message g to message i
decreases the probability of conviction by 1− α.
Simple calculations yield Wg (α) = 0.0072459 + 0.0502036α. With the Bayesian device
γ0 we have Wg (0) = 0.0072459. When the cost is c = 0.014 the player prefers to remain
uninformed and report message i. From Table 1, when α = 0, information acquisition is
more profitable than the uninformative message g only if the state is I, player 1 observes
i and only one of her opponents observes an innocent signal. Player 1 does not have
an incentive to acquire information since the probability of this event is low (equal to
0.03622 9). As α increases, it will become easier to satisfy the incentive constraint. In fact,
when α is greater than 0, information acquisition is also beneficial in the event in which
ω = I and player 1 and two of her opponents observe an innocent signal. The probability
of this event is 0.100 92 (greater than 0.03622 9).
It is easy to check that Wi (α) = 0.0209412 − 0.0318102α. Thus, by increasing α it
becomes more difficult to satisfy the second constraint. However, notice that for α = 0 we
have Wi (0) > c (i.e., the constraint is not binding). Therefore, we can choose levels of α
greater than 0 such that both constraints are still satisfied.
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Of course, this increase in incentives comes at the cost of information aggregation.
Indeed, ex-post efficiency would require α = 0. We are thus interested in finding the
minimal α such that the incentives to purchase information by all five agents would be
satisfied. A simple calculation yields a solution of α = 0.1345. Moreover, the resulting
expected common value is V (5) = −0.1019 > V̂ (2).
As it turns out, an admissible device exists in a committee of size no greater than
six. However, the cost of inducing a sixth player to acquire information is greater than
the benefit of having more information available. That is, γ0.1345 is the solution of the
extended mechanism design and the optimal committee size in this environment is indeed
n∗ = 5 > nB. A graphical illustration of γ0.1345 appears in the next section.
The possibility of communication has significant effects on the probabilities of the two
type of errors the committee can make. Table 2 summarizes the probabilities arising when
choosing optimal committees with and without communication.
Prob(d = C | ω = I)
(Convicting the Innocent)








Table 2: Probabilities of Errors With and Without Communication
Note that in this example both probabilities of error decrease by a significant amount.
We should note that numerous other examples illustrate that this is not a global property.
Introducing communication always decreases at least one of the probabilities of error. The
parameters of the environment determine which of these probabilities decreases.
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5 Comparative Statics
In this section we analyze how the optimal extended mechanism and the quality of the
decision depend on the primitives of the model. We first look at the impact that changes
in the information cost c and in the accuracy of the signal p have on the expected utility of
the designer and on the optimal size of the committee. We then perform the comparative
statics for the agents’ preferences. Finally, we focus on the optimal admissible device.
The Cost of Information
The first, obvious, result is that the expected utility of the optimal mechanism is de-
creasing in the cost of information acquisition. This follows from the fact that for any
given size of the committee, the utility of the optimal devices increases (weakly) when the
cost decreases. In fact, if a device is admissible when the cost is c, then the device is also
admissible when the cost is lower than c.
We now consider how the optimal size is affected by a change in the information cost.
Clearly, given any cost c with optimal size n∗ (c) , we can always find another cost c0,
sufficiently lower than c, such that n∗ (c0) is greater than n∗ (c) . In fact, it is enough to
choose c0 such that the Bayesian device γBn is admissible for some n greater than n
∗ (c) .
Unfortunately, it is less straightforward to perform the comparative statics for small changes
of the information cost. In all the examples we have constructed, the optimal size decreases
when the information cost increases. However, we have not been able to prove that this is
a general result. To illustrate what constitutes a problem, we consider two committees of
size n and n + 1. For any cost c, let us consider the difference between the utility of the
optimal device at n+1 and the utility of the optimal device at n. It is possible to construct
examples such that this difference is positive for low and high values of the cost, but is
negative for intermediate values (in a sense, the utility does not exhibit a single crossing
property).7 In other words, suppose we start with a level of the cost such that size n + 1
7A possible example is the following: P (I) = 12 , q = 0.82, p = 0.55 and n = 7.
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is better than size n. In general, we cannot conclude that this relation holds when the
cost becomes smaller. Of course, this discussion does not show that the optimal size may
increase with the cost. It only explains why it could be difficult to obtain analytical results.
But it remains an open question whether the optimal size is indeed always decreasing in
the cost or not.
The Signals’ Accuracy
As one would expect, the utility of optimal extended mechanism increases when the
signal becomes more accurate, i.e. when p increases. In fact, a stronger result holds. For
a committee of a given size n, the utility of the optimal device increases when the quality
of the signal improves. Intuitively, when the signal is more accurate, the device can ignore
some information and replicate an environment with less information. Formally, let γ be
an admissible device when the accuracy of the signal is p. Suppose now the accuracy is
p̂ > p and consider the following device γ̂. The simplest way to describe γ̂ is to imagine
that each player j reports her signal sj = i, g to a mediator. The mediator then generates
a new variable s0j = i, g at random according to the distribution:
Pr
¡









The variables s01, ..., s
0
n are independent of each other. Finally, the mediator applies
the original device γ to the vector (s01, ..., s
0
n) .
8 Notice that the mediator’s distribution is








= p. Thus, the expected utility
of the device γ̂ when the accuracy is p̂ coincides with the utility of γ when the accuracy is
p. It is also easy to show that γ̂ is admissible (when the accuracy is p̂). This implies that
for any committee size, the utility of the optimal device is increasing in p.
8That is, for every vector (s1, ..., sn) in {i, g}n ,
γ̂ (s1, ..., sn) =
X
(s01,...,s0n)∈{i,g}n
Pr ((s01, ..., s
0
n) | (s1, ..., sn)) γ (s01, ..., s0n) ,
where Pr ((s01, ..., s0n) | (s1, ..., sn)) denotes the probability that the mediator generates the vector (s01, ..., s0n)
when the vector of reports is (s1, ..., sn) .
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While in our model the designer always benefits from a more informative signal, this
is not necessarily the case when communication is not possible. For example, in Persico
[2002] the utility of the optimal mechanism can decrease when p increases. When players
are not allowed to communicate, the designer can induce n agents to acquire information if
and only if V̂ (n)− V̂ (n− 1) is greater than the information cost. When the signal is very
informative, V̂ (n) is close to zero for n relatively small, and therefore it is impossible to
induce many players to acquire information. In contrast, when the signal is less accurate,
the difference V̂ (n)−V̂ (n− 1) can be larger than the cost for large values of n. It is possible
for the designer to prefer having many uninformative signals over a few very accurate ones.9
As far as the optimal size of the committee is concerned, several examples indicate that
it is not monotonic in p. Consider, for instance, the case P (I) = 1
2
, q = 0.62, and c = 0.004.
The optimal size is 13 for p = 0.55, 24 for p = 0.65, and 15 for p = 0.75.
The Preference Parameter
The agents and the designer’s preferences are characterized by the parameter q, the cost
of convicting the innocent. We do not have a formal result for the relation between q and
the optimal size of the committee. However, all the examples that we have constructed
suggest that it depends on the comparison between q and P (G) , the probability that the
defendant is guilty. If q is greater than P (G) , the agents (and the designer) are more
concerned with the error of convicting the innocent, and an uninformed agent would acquit
the defendant. In this case, the optimal size of the committee decreases when q increases.
Conversely, if q is smaller than P (G), the optimal uninformed decision is to convict the
defendant. In this case, the optimal size is increasing in q. Our examples also show that
the utility of the optimal mechanism is not monotonic in q (even if we restrict attention
to values of q above or below P (G)). Finally, notice that similar results hold for the prior
distribution, since q and P (I) play an interchangeable role throughout all of our analysis.
9To give a concrete example, let us assume that P (I) = 12 , q = 0.82, and c = 0.0013. When p = 0.85,
the optimal size is 10 and the utility is −0.001455 (the voting rule is r = 6). However, when p = 0.95, the
optimal size is 4 and the utility is −0.001459 (the voting rule is r = 3).
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The Optimal Device
As was illustrated in Proposition 3, for certain parameters, the optimal device does
not coincide with the corresponding Bayesian device. It is then natural to compare γ̄n∗
with the Bayesian γBn∗, which is graphically represented as a step function achieving the
value of 0 for any k 6 z(n∗) and the value of 1 for any k > z(n∗). There are three main












































Figure 1: The Optimal Devices
First, unlike its Bayesian counterpart, γ̄n∗ may be non-monotonic in the number of




c = 0.004, p = 0.55, and q = 0.62. In this case, the optimal size of the team is n∗ = 13.
Figure 1a plots γ̄n∗ and the Bayesian threshold z(n
∗) and illustrates that γ̄n∗ may indeed
be non-monotonic.
Second, when γ̄n∗ is monotonic, there is no global regularity in its relation to the
Bayesian incentive scheme. Specifically, it can be above γBn∗ (thereby inducing a higher or
equal probability of conviction for any profile of signals), as illustrated in Figure 1b for
the case of P (I) = 1
2
, c = 0.014, p = 0.65, and q = 0.72. It can be below γBn∗ (thereby
inducing a lower or equal probability of conviction), as illustrated in Figure 1c for the case
of P (I) = 1
2
, c = 0.014, p = 0.95, and q = 0.92 (which corresponds to the example of
Section 4.3). It can also be neither below nor above γBn∗, as illustrated in Figure 1d for the
case of P (I) = 1
2
, c = 0.014, p = 0.85, and q = 0.72.
Third, in cases as described above, an agent is pivotal for more than one value of
guilty signals. Intuitively, increasing an agent’s probability of being pivotal (relative to the
Bayesian device) increases her incentives to purchase information. In such situations, this
effect is stronger than the statistical efficiency loss.
6 Conclusions
A group can be identified as a collection of agents satisfying one or more of the following
three elements: sharing a common goal, having a joint task, or possessing the ability to
communicate and exchange information at no costs. The current paper considers groups
satisfying all three conditions and introduces a model of group decision making under
uncertainty.
Our analysis yielded three key insights. First, the optimal incentive scheme in such
an environment balances a trade-off between inducing players to acquire information and
extracting the maximal amount of information from them. In particular, the optimal
device may aggregate information suboptimally from a statistical point of view. Second,
when members of the group decide whether to acquire costly information or not preceding
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the communication stage, groups producing the optimal collective decisions are bounded
in size. Third, the comparative statics of the optimal mechanism exhibit some regularities
and irregularities, e.g., the expected social value is monotonic in the cost of information
and accuracy of private information, but the optimal panel size is not monotonic in the
signals’ accuracy.
In what follows we outline several avenues in which the current framework can be
extended.
First, it would be interesting to investigate additional extended mechanisms. For in-
stance, one could consider a setup in which the designer is able to subsidize agents’ infor-
mation. One example would be a department chair investing in the creation of a centralized
web-site containing all information pertaining to job candidates. Such an investment would
potentially reduce the cost of studying each candidate’s portfolio for all of the hiring com-
mittee members. Formally, in the extended mechanism the designer has to choose the level
of informational subsidies in addition to the size of the group and the communication pro-
tocol. Selecting a high level of subsidies creates a trade-off between inducing more agents
to acquire information, and internalizing some of this information cost by the designer.
A second interesting extension concerns the homogeneity of the players. So far we have
considered homogenous decision panels, in the sense that all players, including the mech-
anism designer, share the same preferences. Concretely, in our model, both the designer
and all of the players share the same utility parameter q. However, in many situations it is
conceivable that agents have heterogenous preferences. One could then study the extended
mechanism design problem in which, at stage 1, the designer chooses the distribution of
preference parameters of the decision panel members, in addition to choosing the panel’s
size and the device. An analysis of such a scenario would entail defining carefully the
goal of the designer (maximizing her own preferences, as characterized by one given q, or
implementing a point in the Pareto frontier of the equilibria set). We are especially inter-
ested in the optimal composition of the decision panel. In particular, would the designer
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choose a committee comprised of agents with preferences coinciding with her own or would
she choose agents with diverging tastes (as observed, e.g., in the optimal choice of central
banker - see, for example, Alesina and Gatti [1995] and references therein)?
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We prove Proposition 1 by demonstrating that when the size of the committee is sufficiently
large there is no device that satisfies constraint (ICi). The choice of the constraint is
arbitrary since we could prove the same result for constraint (ICg).10









f (k + 1;n) (γ (k + 1)− γ (k)) .
For ease of presentation, we will drop the argument n in f throughout this proof. Hn (γ)
can be expressed as:







(1− p)k pn−k−1 1
k
h (k) γ (k) + f (n) γ (n) ,
where





(k − np) .
For n sufficiently large, −f (1) > 0 and f (n) > 0. Moreover, h (k) < 0 for k in
[n (1− p) , np] .
Let bn(1 − p)c denote the greatest integer smaller than n (1− p) . For every k =
1, ..., bn(1− p)c− 1, we have:






10In this proof, we show how to construct an upper bound on the size of the committees that have
admissible devices. The fact that we do not consider both constraints at the same time implies that our
bound is not tight. Admissible devices may not exist even when the size of the committee is smaller than
our bound.
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Notice that the right hand side of the above inequality is positive when n is sufficiently
large. Similarly, let dnpe be the smallest integer greater than np. For k = dnpe+1, ..., n−1,






and the right hand side is positive for n sufficiently large.




and let γ+ denote the solution. Define H̄n = Hn (γ+) . It follows from the analysis above
that when n is sufficiently large, the device γ+ is of the form:
γ+ (k) =
½
1 if k = 0, ..., k0, k00, ..., n
0 if k = k0 + 1, ..., k00 − 1













When n is sufficiently large, both −f (k0 + 1) and f (k00) are positive. Furthermore,
−f (k0 + 1) 6 qP (I) (1− p)n(1−p)−1 pnp+1 − (1− q)P (G) pn(1−p)−1 (1− p)np+1
since k0 belongs to [n (1− p)− 2, n (1− p)) , and
f (k00) 6 −qP (I) (1− p)np+2 pn(1−p)−2 + (1− q)P (G) pnp+2 (1− p)n(1−p)−2
since k00 belongs to (np, np+ 2] .
To bound the binomial coefficients in the expression of H̄n, we now introduce Stirling’s











12n = l2 (n) .
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For every n, the function l2(n)
l1(x)l1(n−x) is increasing for x <
n
2
, and decreasing for x > n
2
.









































l1 (np) l1 (n (1− p)) .
After substituting the above inequalities in the expression of H̄n and performing some













The right hand side of the above inequality decreases in n and converges to zero as n
goes to infinity. Thus, the claim of Proposition 1 follows.
Proof of Proposition 2
First, suppose that V̂ (n) = V (0) = V̂ (n− 1) . It follows that either γBn (0) = ... = γBn (n) ,
or γBn (0) = 0, f (0;n) = 0 and γ
B
n (1) = ... = γ
B
n (n) = 1. In both cases, the left hand side
of constraint (ICg) is zero.
Thus, we now assume that V̂ (n) > V (0) . This implies that z (n) is in (0, n) and kn,
the smallest integer greater than z (n), belongs to {1, ..., n} . Depending on the distance
between kn and z (n) , there are two cases to consider.
Case (i): 0 < kn − z (n) 6 12 . In this case, it is easy to check that:











< kn − z (n) 6 1. Then we have:





f (kn − 1;n) ,
and
−f (kn − 1;n) < f (kn;n) .










f (kn − 1;n) > c. (6)
Clearly, the two inequalities above hold if and only if V̂ (n)− V̂ (n− 1) > c.
Proof of Proposition 3
For every c, let nB (c) denote the largest integer for which the Bayesian device is admissible.
We show that if nB (c) is sufficiently large then V
¡







complete the proof of Proposition 3 since nB (c) is decreasing in c.
We now fix c and write n for nB (c). We assume 0 < kn − z (n) < 12 (the proof for the
case 1
2
< kn − z (n) < 1 is similar and is therefore omitted).11 The Bayesian device γBn is
admissible, and so inequalities (5) and (6) hold.
Consider now a committee of size n+ 1. For every α in the unit interval, let the device
γα : {0, ..., n+ 1} be defined by:
γα (k) =
 0 if k = 0, ..., kn − 1α if k = kn
1 if k = kn + 1, ..., n+ 1
.




















11Since the environment is regular, kn − z(n) 6= 12 , 1.
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The function F is decreasing in α. We now assume that n is sufficiently large, so that











f (kn;n) > c,
and that L is an increasing function that satisfies:










f (kn − 1;n) > c.
We let α̂1 denote the greatest value of α for which the device γα satisfies constraint
(7). Similarly, we let α̂2 denote the smallest value of α for which the device γα satisfies





















































f (kn − 1;n+ 1)
≡ α2.
With a slight abuse of notation we let V (α) denote the expected utility of the device
γα :












f (k;n+ 1) .
The difference between V (α) and V̂ (n) is equal to:








n− kn + 1α− 1
¶
.
Let α∗ = n−kn+1
n+1
. Then V (α) is greater than V̂ (n) if and only if α < α∗.
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It remains to be shown that α2 < α∗ and α2 < α1 for sufficiently large values of n. Let
us start with the first inequality. We need to show:































(nf (kn;n+ 1) + nf (kn − 1;n+ 1) + (n+ 1) f (kn;n)) > 0.





, and notice that
f (kn;n+ 1) + f (kn − 1;n+ 1) = f (kn − 1;n) .
We obtain:
−nf (kn − 1;n)− (n+ 1) f (kn;n) > 0.













the right hand side is decreasing in n, and converges to 1 as n goes to infinity.






qP (I) (1− p)z(n) pn−z(n), rearrange terms and obtain:
α1 =
³




















(1− p)λ p1−λ − pλ (1− p)1−λ
´ .


















(1− p)λ p−λ − pλ (1− p)−λ
´
− (1− p)1+λ p−λ + p1+λ (1− p)−λ
− (1− p)1+λ p−λ + p1+λ (1− p)−λ + (1− p)λ p1−λ − pλ (1− p)1−λ .
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− (1− p)λ p−λ + pλ (1− p)−λ
´
− (1− p)λ p1−λ + pλ (1− p)1−λ
− (1− p)λ p1−λ + pλ (1− p)1−λ + (1− p)λ−1 p2−λ − pλ−1 (1− p)2−λ .
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